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 Abstract 
 
 This paper reviews the extant empirical studies of financial innovation.  Adopting broad 
criteria, we found just two-dozen studies (24), over half of which (14) had been conducted since 
2000.  Since some financial innovations are examined by more than one study, only 14 distinct 
phenomena have been covered.  Especially striking is the fact that only two studies are directed at 
the hypotheses advanced in many broad descriptive articles concerning the environmental 
conditions (e.g., regulation, taxes, unstable macroeconomic conditions, and ripe technologies) 
spurring financial innovation. We offer some tentative conjectures as to why empirical studies of 
financial innovation are comparatively rare.  Among our suggested culprits is an absence of 
accessible data.  We urge financial regulators to undertake more surveys of financial innovation and 
to make the survey data more available to researchers. 
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Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little Action? 
 
"... the word revolution is entirely appropriate for describing the changes in financial institutions 
and instruments that have occurred in the past twenty years." Miller (1986, p. 437) 
 
"Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it." Mark Twain (attributed) 
 
"Everybody talks about financial innovation, but (almost) nobody empirically tests hypotheses 
about it." Frame and White 
 
I. Introduction 
 The rising importance of the financial sector in modern economies, as well as the rapid rate 
of innovation in that sector, has generated a research interest in financial innovation.  Indeed, a 
broad descriptive literature that discusses recent financial innovations and that advances various 
hypotheses about them has arisen (Van Horne 1985; Miller 1986, 1992; Mayer 1986; Cooper 1986; 
Faulhaber and Baumol 1988; Campbell 1988, ch. 16; Siegel 1990; Finnerty 1992; Merton 1992; 
Kopcke 1995; Tufano 1995; Lea 1996; Finnerty and Emery, 2002). 
 A striking feature of this literature, however, is the relative dearth of empirical studies that 
test hypotheses or otherwise provide a quantitative analysis of financial innovation.  This is 
surprising given the relative abundance of similar papers for other sectors of the economy, 
especially manufacturing and agriculture. 
 One stark indicator of this dearth is found in two earlier survey articles of innovation 
generally (Cohen and Levin 1989; Cohen 1995).  Cohen and Levin (1989) included 251 articles and 
books (both theoretical and empirical) in their bibliography, none of which pertain to financial 
services;1 Cohen (1995) updates the earlier survey and includes 357 books and articles, none of 
which pertain to financial services.  In our current efforts to scour the financial literature landscape, 
using fairly broad criteria, we could find only two-dozen articles that provide empirical tests of 
                                                           
    1 The closest that Cohen and Levin come to any mention of financial services was a discussion of three 
articles that used stock market event studies to measure the effects of specific (non-financial) innovations. 
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hypotheses concerning financial innovation; and, as we show below, the actual phenomena studied 
are appreciably fewer, since a number of these papers have focused on the same handful of 
innovations.  Even more striking, only two studies are directed at the hypotheses that are advanced 
in that broad descriptive literature. 
 This paper will provide a survey of the literature on financial innovation, with a special 
emphasis on the empirical articles.2  Along the way, we will provide an analytic structure for 
understanding and organizing the types of financial innovations and the hypotheses that have been 
advanced to explain the patterns of financial innovation.  We will also offer some conjectures as to 
why empirical testing has been so scarce in this area. 
 This paper will proceed as follows.  Section II provides motivation for this review: what is 
financial innovation? and why is financial innovation important?  Section III describes the various 
factors that tend to influence the flow of innovations generally and the flow of financial innovations 
specifically.  Section IV outlines several research questions that would be appropriate for empirical 
research on financial innovation.  Section V surveys the existing empirical studies of financial 
innovation.  Section VI offers some possible reasons for the paucity of empirical studies.  
Concluding remarks are provided in Section VII. 
 
II. Some Background 
 Although financial innovation is all around us – the plastic in our wallets, the new financial 
instruments listed in the daily financial pages, the now-ubiquitous automatic teller machines 
(ATMs) that likely dispensed most of the cash that we carry in our purses and pockets -- a 
background discussion of financial innovation will be worthwhile. 
                                                           
    2 Although we have not found a comparable survey of the theoretical literature related to financial 
innovation, Duffie and Rahi (1995) introduce a special issue of the Journal of Economic Theory that focuses 
on financial innovation and security design. 
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 A. What is financial innovation? 
 "The primary function of the financial system is to facilitate the allocation and deployment 
of economic resources, both spatially and across time, in an uncertain environment." (Merton 1992, 
p. 12)  This function, in turn, encompasses a payments system with a medium of exchange; the 
transfer of resources from savers to investor-users of the resources (and the eventual repayment to 
the savers); the gathering of savings for the purposes of pure time transformation (i.e., 
deferral/smoothing of consumption); and the reduction of risk through insurance and 
diversification. 
 The operation of a financial system involves real resource costs, such as labor, materials, 
and capital employed by financial intermediaries (e.g., banks, insurance companies, etc.) and by 
financial facilitators (e.g., stock brokers, market makers, financial advisors, etc.).  Further, since 
multiple time periods are an inherent characteristic of finance, there are also uncertainties about 
future states of the world that generate risks.  For risk-averse individuals, these risks represent costs. 
 The possibility of new financial products/services/instruments that can better satisfy financial 
system participants' demands is always present.  Viewed in this context, a financial innovation 
represents something new that reduces costs, reduces risks, or provides an improved 
product/service/instrument that better satisfies participants' demands.   
 Financial innovations can be grouped as new products (e.g., adjustable rate mortgages;  
exchange-traded index funds); new services (e.g., on-line securities trading; Internet banking); new 
"production" processes (e.g., electronic record-keeping for securities; credit scoring); or new 
organizational forms (e.g., a new type of electronic exchange for trading securities; Internet-only 
banks).  Of course, if a new intermediate product or service is created and used by financial services 
firms, then it may become part of a new financial production process. 
 There are close analogies with familiar forms of innovation in non-financial contexts.  
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There we see new products (e.g., DVD players; self-stick postage stamps); new services (e.g., 
Internet-based retail shopping); new production processes (e.g., improved processes for 
manufacturing computer chips) and new organizational forms (e.g., the "M-form" decentralized 
corporate structure).3  And innovations in producer goods are often essential for innovations in 
production processes. 
 Much of the research attention to innovation focuses on the new idea.  But at least as 
important is the adoption and spread of an innovation -- its diffusion -- across an industry.  Indeed, 
faster diffusion means a higher societal return on the underlying investments in the innovation. 
 
 B. Why is financial innovation important? 
 Innovation is clearly an important phenomenon in any sector of a modern economy.  
Although standard microeconomic theory (rightly) focuses much of its attention on the issues of 
static resource allocation and economic efficiency, there is nevertheless general appreciation that 
performance over time is driven by a variety of dynamic factors,4 including innovation.5  The 
centrality of finance in an economy and its importance for economic growth (e.g., Levine, 1997) 
naturally raises the importance of financial innovation.  Since finance is an input for virtually all 
production activity and much consumption activity, improvements in the financial sector will have 
positive direct ramifications throughout the economy.  Further, since better finance can encourage 
more saving and investment and can also encourage better (more productive) investment decisions, 
                                                           
    3 The M-form structure was originally discussed by Drucker (1946), Sloan (1964), Chandler (1962), and 
Williamson (1975). 
    4 "Making the best use of resources at any moment in time is important.  But in the long run, it is dynamic 
performance that counts" (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 613). 
    5 From Solow (1957) onward, there has been a widespread realization that expansions of the capital stock 
of an economy are responsible for only a modest fraction of economic growth.  The remainder, or residual, 
is due to a number of factors, of which research and development and the resultant innovations are a major 
component (Scherer and Ross 1990). 
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these indirect positive effects from financial innovation are yet greater still. 
 
III. What Motivates Innovation in General and Financial Innovation in Particular? 
 Profit-seeking enterprises and individuals are constantly seeking new and improved 
products, processes, and organizational structures that will reduce their costs of production, better 
satisfy customer demands, and yield greater profits.  Sometimes this search occurs through formal 
research and development programs; sometimes it occurs through more informal "tinkering" or trial 
and error efforts.  When successful, the result is an innovation.6   
 If the search-and-success were a relatively constant phenomenon, innovations would tend to 
appear in a roughly continuous stream.  However, since the observed streams of innovations do not 
appear to be uniform across all enterprises, across all industries, or across all time periods, the 
general innovation literature (see Cohen and Levin 1989; Cohen 1995) has sought to uncover the 
environmental conditions that may encourage greater (or lesser) search efforts and a larger (or 
smaller) stream of innovations.  That literature has focused on hypotheses concerning roughly five 
structural conditions: (1) the market power of enterprises; (2) the size of enterprises; (3) 
technological opportunity; (4) appropriability; and (5) product market demand conditions.  We will 
first briefly sketch these general conditions and then will focus on financial innovation and the 
environmental factors that the descriptive literature (cited above) suggests may encourage financial 
innovation; we will also relate these latter factors back to the general conditions. 
 
 A. General structural conditions. 
 1. Market power.  This hypothesis originates with Schumpeter (1950), who argued that 
market power is necessary to permit firms to generate sufficient returns from innovation.  This is 
                                                           
    6 We will not here try to delve deeper into the "microstructure" of specifically how and why a "flash of 
inspiration" arises, generating an idea that eventually becomes an innovation. 
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because of: (1) the inherent public good/free rider problems associated with new ideas, and (2) the 
difficulties of obtaining the finance for the sizable and uncertain investment in research and 
development (R&D) that is often required for successful innovation. 
 2. Enterprise size.  This hypothesis also is identified with Schumpeter (1950).  A larger size 
of an enterprise implies that the sale of the product embodying the innovation is likely to be large, 
yielding a greater return on the investment in the innovation.  Also, greater size is necessary to 
allow the firm to accommodate the economies of scale inherent in R&D facilities, which are 
necessary to yield innovations.  Finally, greater size is more likely to accommodate a wider range of 
activities and products, which may allow the firm to capture more of the unexpected spin-offs of the 
uncertain R&D process.7 
 3. Technological opportunity.  Some industry technologies seem inherently more 
susceptible to innovation.  For the past few decades, for example, computer chips, hardware, and 
software have experienced rapid technological progress; in earlier decades, the chemical industry 
seemed to have this susceptibility. 
 4. Appropriability.  As mentioned above, information has the properties of a public good.  
In the absence of some protection or frictions, a productive new idea will be rapidly copied by rivals 
(who, in a competitive marketplace, will price their output at marginal cost), thereby depriving the 
originator a return on his original investment in the innovation.  The property rights regimes 
embodied in patents, copyrights, and trademarks provide some protections for innovators.  Trade 
secrets and proprietary know-how provide additional protections, even where formal intellectual 
property protections are not available. 
 5. Product market demand conditions.  Market size and growth are the main features 
                                                           
    7 Implicit in this discussion is the notion that innovations – expected and unexpected – are difficult to 
license or sell to other enterprises (because of asymmetric information problems), so that a firm must rely on 
its own capabilities.  This is, of course, related to the appropriability issues discussed below.  
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capturing product market demand conditions.  Specifically, a larger market will provide a greater 
return to a successful innovative effort, while a growing market is likely to provide the rents 
(profits) that can both entice and finance innovation.  Other market characteristics might also be 
influential, such as the variability of demand, general macroeconomic conditions, tax regimes, 
regulatory regimes, etc. 
 It should be emphasized that these conditions are hypotheses, to which counter-hypotheses 
have sometimes been offered.  For example, in contrast to the Schumpeterian hypotheses that 
suggest that monopoly and giant size are conducive to rapid innovation, Scherer (1984) suggests 
that smaller firms, with (at most) only modest levels of market power, may be more likely to be 
rapid innovators, because of the competitive pressures that are absent in the "quiet life" world of 
monopoly.8 
 
 B. The conditions that influence "equilibrium" rates of financial innovation. 
 The descriptive literature that we cited above has suggested a number of environmental 
factors that have encouraged financial innovation.  The list provided by Campbell (1988, ch. 16) is 
the most inclusive, and we will draw heavily on it.  But, as good as Campbell's list is, it is seriously 
incomplete, because it focuses only on the levels of environmental factors and neglects changes in 
environmental factors, as we will explain below. 
 1. Underlying technologies.  The basic underlying "physical" technologies of finance are 
those of telecommunications and data processing, which permit the gathering of information, its 
transmission, and its analysis.  Increasingly, these technologies allow financial market participants 
to measure and manage their risk exposures more efficiently and effectively.  For example, with 
respect to lending, asymmetric information problems imply that lenders have difficulties 
                                                           
    8 And in response, Schumpeter (1950) likely would have argued that the possibilities of entry by one giant 
firm into another’s field was always enough of a possibility that the ”quiet life” was not a likely prospect. 
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determining who is a creditworthy borrower (adverse selection) and also have difficulties 
monitoring borrowers after a loan has been made (moral hazard).  Accordingly, better (more 
advanced, faster, lower cost) physical technologies have permitted more innovations (e.g., credit 
and behavioral scoring) that allow lenders better to overcome those asymmetric information 
problems.  Similarly, in terms of market risk, the use of value-at-risk and portfolio stress testing 
provide useful risk measures that can be used internally to set risk tolerance levels or allocate 
capital and externally to provide investors with a sense of overall exposure.  Better physical 
technologies may also permit organizational innovations (e.g., electronic securities exchanges) that 
would not be possible with less advanced technologies. 
 There is another technological dimension that is important for finance: intellectual 
technologies, such as the Black-Scholes option pricing model or the capital-asset-pricing model 
(CAPM).  Advances in these technologies will, again, permit a wider range of innovations (e.g., 
computer programs that will readily compute option values). 
 This category of environmental conditions for financial innovation has a direct parallel to 
the "technological opportunity" category of the general list above. 
 2. Macroeconomic conditions.  Unstable macroeconomic conditions -- e.g., fluctuating 
prices, interest rates, exchange rates -- create uncertainties and risks and thus are likely to spur more 
innovation (to alleviate those risks) than would be true in a stable macroeconomic environment.  
Greater instability is likely to be associated with a faster pace of innovation. 
 This environmental condition seems best categorized as a parallel of "product market 
demand conditions" in the general list. 
 3. Regulation (legal environment).9  Regulation is a two-edged sword.  On the one hand, 
some forms of regulation must inhibit innovation.  For example, if regulation prevents commercial 
                                                           
    9 A more extensive discussion of the interaction between regulation and financial innovation can be found 
in White (2000). 
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banks from owning insurance companies (and vice-versa), then whatever innovations might arise 
from joint ownership and operation will not occur.  But, on the other hand, it is also clear that 
innovation can arise from efforts to circumvent regulation.  To continue with the bank/insurance 
example, if cross-ownership is prevented, then banks will have the incentive to create insurance-
like products and services (but, of course, will avoid labeling them as insurance), while insurance 
companies will have an incentive to create bank-like products.  Accordingly, it is impossible a 
priori to assign a positive or negative sign to the connection between the stringency of regulation 
(however measured) and the pace of financial innovation.  
 Also, the innovation that arises as a consequence of regulation may be a socially positive or 
negative phenomenon.  This depends on whether one sees the regulation itself as socially 
worthwhile (so that innovative evasion is a waste of resources or may even have socially deleterious 
consequences) or as a social waste (in which case the innovative evasion is a second-best 
improvement). 
 Again, this environmental condition seems best categorized as a parallel of “product market 
demand conditions” in the general list. 
 4. Taxes.  To the extent that a tax system levies differential taxes on different streams of 
income or on different categories of assets, the higher taxed parties will seek ways of reducing their 
taxes.  Financial innovation will follow.  Higher levels of taxation will likely yield a larger flow of 
innovation.  Again, whether one sees this innovation as a socially positive or negative phenomenon 
will depend on the social interpretation that one puts on the differential taxation scheme. 
 Again, this environmental condition seems best categorized as a parallel to "product market 
demand conditions" in the general list. 
 5. Other influences?  It is noteworthy that Campbell’s list does not include appropriability 
(and the intellectual property considerations that are associated with appropriability) or the 
Schumpeterian hypotheses of firm size and market power.  Traditionally, the intellectual property 
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protection system (i.e., patent, copyright, trademark) has not been considered important for 
financial innovation; patents for financial innovations were a rare phenomenon before 1980 and 
only became noticeable and significant in the late-1990s (Lerner 2002).  Since Tufano (1989) 
shows that imitation of some innovations is rapid, a regime of intellectual property protection could 
encourage greater innovation.10  As for the Schumpeterian hypotheses, the absence of formal R&D 
facilities in financial services firms has probably been a significant factor in the relative neglect of 
the size and market-power considerations with respect to financial innovation. 
 Also, neither the general innovation literature nor the financial innovation literature has 
satisfactorily addressed how the presence of network externality effects (Rohlfs 1974) influences 
the type and pace of innovation.11  With networks, the benefits to membership increase as more 
members join the network.  Also, economies of scale and compatibility among members are usually 
important features of networks.  The implications for innovation are cloudy, but potentially 
important.  Incremental innovations within the compatibility confines of a network are clearly 
possible.  But the scale-related problems of creating new networks may discourage such “large” 
innovations. 
 6. Interactive effects.  The categories discussed above are not mutually exclusive.  There 
may well be interactions among them.  For example, regulations that are non-binding under one set 
of environmental conditions may be binding under another and may inspire circumventing 
innovations in the latter state, provided that the technological capabilities are present.  For example, 
it is clear that the greater macroeconomic fluctuations of the late 1960s and the 1970s caused a 
tighter binding of the Federal Reserve's Regulation Q (which limited the payment of interest on 
                                                           
    10 It is also possible, however, that excessively broad protection for ideas could discourage follow-on 
innovation, because of the transaction costs of negotiations between the original innovator and the follow-on 
innovators. 
    11 The exception in the financial innovation literature, which we note below, is Saloner and Shepard 
(1995). 
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bank deposits).  This, in turn, inspired innovations such as money market mutual funds, "sweep 
accounts" for bank deposits, and Merrill Lynch’s “cash management account”; but these 
innovations would not have been possible without the improved computer and telecommunications 
capabilities of the 1970s. 
 
 C. Changes in environmental conditions. 
 The environmental factors described above represent the influences on the "equilibrium" 
flow of financial innovation.  What is left out of that discussion is the consequences of a change in 
an environmental condition.  When changes occur, we expect an initial wave or flurry of financial 
innovations that represent an initial response; the flow of innovations will then, over time, settle to 
a new equilibrium flow that is appropriate to the new environmental conditions.12  Thus a 
significant change in any of the major environmental categories would likely induce (with some 
lag) its own initial wave of innovations that would eventually settle to a lower equilibrium rate. 
 For example, the end of fixed exchange rates and the greater uncertainty surrounding 
fluctuating exchange rates in the early 1970s would naturally have led to an initial flurry of 
financial innovations -- foreign exchange, futures, forwards, and options -- to respond to the regime 
change.  Such contracts might have been feasible before the change but simply were not in demand. 
                                                           
    12 We can offer a few analogies.  First, for durable goods, it is generally believed (Pindyk and Rubinfeld 
2001, p. 36) that the elasticity of demand is greater in the short run than in the long run (unlike the 
presumption that applies to non-durables).  This is because (say) a price decrease causes an immediate flurry 
of buying activity, which is then followed by a reversion to a longer-run stock-replacement equilibrium.  
Similarly, in understanding the perceived pattern of law suits, law-and-economics theory (e.g., Priest and 
Klein 1984; Salop and White 1986) has postulated that the flow of suits is larger when litigants have 
mutually inconsistent expectations as to the likely outcomes (and each side is excessively optimistic as to its 
own prospects and so insists on proceeding to a trial rather than reaching a settlement that would economize 
on further legal costs).  A change in a law or in a Supreme Court interpretation will generate a period of 
greater uncertainty as to how judges and juries will decide cases, leading to a wave of new law suits (that do 
not settle) until subsequent legal decision patterns are revealed and the litigants can form clearer 
expectations as to their prospects. 
  
 
12
 After this initial wave (which could be of indeterminate length, because of lags), financial 
innovation in this area would settle to a new equilibrium flow (which would likely be greater than 
the old equilibrium flow because of the changed environment).  And if the system of exchange rates 
were perceived to shift to a new "regime" of even greater variability, then we would expect to see 
another flurry of innovation. 
 Accordingly, it appears that the wave of innovations of the 1970s and 1980s that inspired 
the descriptive literature that we cited above13 was in part a response to changes in important 
environmental factors at the time, such as the rise in levels and variance of interest rates; the end of 
the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates; rapid technological changes in 
telecommunications and data processing; and major intellectual breakthroughs, such as the Black-
Scholes model.  This perception of a wave due to changes in the environment would be consistent 
with Miller's (1986, p. 471) prediction that "the prospect for the future is for a slowing down of the 
rate of financial innovation ... a slowing down of innovation, not an end to further progress." 
 Further, in this context of environmental changes, even if a regulation or a tax rate changes 
in a direction that creates an environment that would induce a reduced equilibrium flow of evasion-
motivated innovations, there might nevertheless be an initial wave of greater innovation as the 
participants in the financial markets adjust to the new environment. 
 Finally, these dynamic considerations are probably best categorized as a parallel to the 
"product market demand conditions" of the general list. 
 
IV. Potential Empirical Research Questions Concerning Financial Innovation 
                                                           
    13 "A partial list of major novelties would include, in no particular order: negotiable CDs, Eurodollar 
accounts, Eurobonds, sushi bonds, floating-rate bonds, putable bonds, zero coupon bonds, stripped bonds, 
options, financial futures, options on futures, options on indexes, money market funds, cash management 
accounts, income warrants, collateralized mortgages, home equity loans, currency swaps, floor-ceiling 
swaps, exchangeable bonds, and on and on.  The mind boggles" (Miller 1986, p. 437). 
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 What are the interesting research questions concerning financial innovation that could be 
explored empirically?  We pose this question primarily as a way of establishing a framework for 
organizing the actual empirical studies that we review in the next section.  However, it is a 
worthwhile question in its own right. 
 1. The environmental conditions that encourage innovation.  As we discussed in the 
previous section, these are the research questions that have occupied much of the empirical 
literature on innovation generally.  For financial innovation, the environmental factors that 
Campbell (1988) suggests, as well as the changes-in-environment considerations that we have 
added, would be a good starting place.  Also, the intellectual property concerns of the general 
literature, the Schumpeterian hypotheses, as well as the consequences of network effects, would be 
interesting topics for empirical research.14  In addition, some additional characteristics of firms – 
say, organizational form and the characteristics of senior management – may be important. 
 2. The customers for and users of innovations.  This topic is somewhat related to the first, 
but is distinguishable.  First, the actual innovators may be outside the financial services sector and 
are suppliers to it.  Why does the innovation originate outside the financial sector rather than within 
it?  Who are the adopters within the financial sector?  What are their characteristics?  Second, for 
innovations of new financial products aimed at retail users, who are the latter and what are their 
characteristics? 
 3. Diffusion.  The rapidity with which an innovation is adopted across an industry is an 
interesting question that is separate from those that focus on where and how innovations first arise. 
                                                           
    14 For example, casual empiricism leads us to notice that relatively large financial services providers have 
been important innovators.  Merrill Lynch was the developer of the "cash management account"; Salomon 
Brothers was the leader in developing stripped Treasury securities; the larger commercial banks led in 
developing and offering “sweep” accounts, ATMs, and Internet transactions for customers.  But it would be 
useful to have a more formal "census" of innovations and their originators and the characteristics of those 
innovators.  Perhaps smaller institutions have been significant innovators in ways that have escaped our 
attention. 
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Who are the early adopters?  What are their characteristics?  What are the conditions that encourage 
rapid spread?  Is geography important? 
 4. Consequences: profitability and social welfare.  What are the consequences of financial 
innovation in terms of the pay-offs to the innovators and the impact on society as a whole?  At first 
blush this latter question may seem to be an uninteresting one to ask.  After all, innovation generally 
does seem to have positive social effects in raising real incomes.  Nevertheless, there are three 
strands of theoretical literature that point to potentially negative social welfare outcomes from 
innovation and related activities.  First, a steady sequence of slightly improved innovations that 
progressively supplant each other – each of which appears profitable and worthwhile from a myopic 
perspective that ignores what follows -- could lead to a net negative social welfare outcome, where 
the sum of the successive sunk investment costs exceeds the marginal cost reductions that they 
accomplish (Tirole 1988, p. 399).  Second, the duplication of effort in patent races can have a net 
negative social welfare outcome (Tirole, 1988, p. 399).  Third, information generation and related 
innovations that are focused purely on rent-seeking distributional struggles have a negative social 
value.15 
 Indeed, some of the general descriptive literature on financial innovation has a somewhat 
defensive tone, in that the authors feel required to argue that the financial innovations are not 
socially harmful.16  The authors seem to be addressing fears that the innovations will simply lead to 
more transactions or churning in the financial markets, without net gains; that the innovations will 
create greater instability of securities markets; that the innovations will allow the taking of greater 
                                                           
    15 For example, suppose that person A owns a house on a flood plain and person B is considering buying 
it.  Both may invest considerable resources in weather forecasting – maybe even invent some new 
forecasting devices or algorithms -- so as to determine the probabilities of a heavy rainfall and ruinous flood, 
which then helps determine the appropriate price for the house.  But, if nothing can be done to prevent the 
flood – if this is solely a distributional question – then the expenditures have a negative social value. 
    16 Consider the titles chosen by Van Horne (1985) (“Of Financial Innovations and Excesses”) and by 
Mayer (1986) ("Financial Innovation: Curse or Blessing?"). 
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risks; and/or that the innovations can be inappropriately used by unsophisticated parties to the 
latter's detriment. 
 In sum, there is a wide range of interesting empirical questions that can be addressed in 
research on financial innovation. 
 
V. Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation 
 This section reviews the extant empirical literature on financial innovation.  There were two 
broad criteria for inclusion in the review: 
•= Empirical: The article must have formally presented data and tested hypotheses, so that a 
standard error appeared somewhere in the article.  Thus, a purely descriptive article would not 
qualify. 
•= Innovation:  The article must have examined a financial product/process/organization during a 
period when it was considered relatively novel.  For example, studies of the deployment of 
ATMs using data from the late 1970’s would be appropriate, but a similar study using data only 
from the late 1990’s would not.   
As an organizing framework, we use the research categories delineated in the previous section.17  
The Appendix provides a concise description of the studies in terms of the economic questions 
examined, data samples employed, and conclusions. 
 
 A. The environmental conditions that encourage innovation. 
 We could find only two studies that focus primarily on the environmental conditions that 
                                                           
    17 Because of space constraints, these very brief reviews do not do full justice to the depth, breadth, and 
complexity of the articles that we review. 
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encourage financial innovation.   
 Ben-Horim and Silber (1977) test the proposition that regulatory constraints induce 
innovation.  They construct a linear programming model to estimate the opportunity costs (shadow 
prices) of deposits, debentures, and capital (net worth) for large banks from 1952-1972.  They find 
that the rising shadow prices of these items, as they approached regulatory constraints (such as 
Regulation Q), were associated with some of the major innovations of the 1960s, such as the 
negotiable CD. 
 Lerner (2002) documented financial patenting activity in the late twentieth century (455 
patents between 1971-2000).  He notes that although the level of patenting activity has been 
modest, it increased markedly after a 1998 judicial decision (the State Street Bank case) that 
allowed for business method patents.  Lerner also studies the patenting activity of investment banks 
and finds that it was positively related to the size of the investment banks and to the extent of their 
indirect academic ties.  He also finds, however, that the direct involvement of academic institutions 
or of academics themselves in financial patenting was not related to finance-related research 
productivity of the institutions or the individuals. 
 
 B. The customers for and users of innovations. 
 We were able to find a somewhat larger number of studies that focused on the 
characteristics of customers for and users of financial innovations.  These studies have focused on: 
1) banks’ adoption of Internet banking and small business credit scoring (SBCS), and 2) 
consumers’ use of ATM cards, debit cards, and electronic bill payment services. 
 There have been two studies of commercial banks’ adoption of Internet banking.18  Furst, 
Lang, and Nolle (2002) analyze survey data on Internet banking as of the third quarter of 1999.  
                                                           
    18 Internet banking refers to web-sites that are either exclusively informational in nature or offer the 
capability to conduct banking business on-line.  
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Using logit models, they find that a bank’s choice of adopting Internet banking is related to holding 
company affiliation, location in an urban area, higher fixed expenses, and higher non-interest 
income.  Among banks that offer Internet-related services, a greater number of service offerings 
were positively related to bank size and the length of time offering Internet banking.  Sullivan 
(2000) compares banks in the 10th Federal Reserve district19 that had transactional Internet web-
sites as of the first quarter of 2000 to those that did not have such web-sites.  He finds the former to 
be significantly larger and located in areas with a more educated population and a higher population 
fraction in the 18 to 64 age group.  Banks offering transactional Internet web-sites are also found to 
have higher non-interest expenses and higher non-interest income. 
 In the course of their study of the effect of SBCS on large banks’ portfolio of commercial 
loans under $100,000 for 1997 (discussed below), Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) find that 
the probability of adopting this process innovation was negatively related to the number of 
subsidiary banks, but positively related to the number of bank branches.  This suggests a link 
between organizational structure and the adoption of certain technologies. 
 Mantel (2000) and Mantel and McHugh (2001) both use a consumer survey of 1,300 people 
to study usage of electronic bill payment and debit cards.  In the former study, the usage of 
electronic bill payment services is found to be positively related to age, income, and gender 
(female).  The latter study finds that debit card usage is related to age, income, and market size 
(population). 
 
 C. Diffusion. 
 We are aware of five studies of the diffusion of financial innovations, three of which 
focus on ATM deployment by banks.  These studies generally use hazard models that estimate 
                                                           
    19 The 10th Federal Reserve District encompasses Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Wyoming. 
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the adoption pattern of the innovation under study conditional on firm- and market-specific 
effects. 
 Hannan and McDowell (1984) find that -- consistent with the Schumpeterian hypotheses -- 
larger banks and those operating in more concentrated local banking markets registered a higher 
conditional probability of ATM adoption.  This study also found bank product mix, bank holding 
company affiliation, urban location, branch banking restrictions, and the area wage rate were all 
positively related to ATM adoption. 
 In a subsequent study, Hannan and McDowell (1987) find that the conditional probability of 
ATM adoption is positively related to a rival's adoption and that firms in less concentrated markets 
react more strongly to rival precedence than do their counterparts in concentrated markets.  
Consistent with their previous results, bank size and local market concentration were positively 
related to ATM adoption.  Similar results were found for bank holding company affiliation, branch 
banking restrictions, and market deposit growth.20 
   Using the same data, Saloner and Shepherd (1995) find that the expected time to adoption 
of ATMs declines in both the number of users (deposits) and locations (branches), indicating the 
presence of network externalities.  For limited branching states, market concentration is 
positively related to ATM adoption speed, while depositor growth is negatively related.  For 
unrestricted states, the area bank wage rate is positively related to ATM adoption speed. 
 Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996) examine the diffusion of the underwriting of junk bonds 
and of note issuance facilities (NIFs) during the 1978-1988 and 1983-1986 periods, respectively. 21  
The authors find that exogenous factors, such as regulatory or demand changes, played a significant 
                                                           
20 Interestingly, in this follow-up paper (and using the same data) the author’s did not include the product 
mix and urban location variables that were significant in their initial paper. 
 21 A note issuance facility is an arrangement by which a bank or group of banks agree to act as managers 
underwriting a borrower's issue on short-term paper as and when required and to back the facility with 
medium-term credit should the note not find a market (Molyneux and Shamroukh 1996, 513). 
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role in the diffusion of junk bond underwriting.  Conversely, the diffusion of NIFs underwriting 
appeared to be motivated by bandwagon effects.  Molyneux and Shamroukh argue that banks 
(commercial and investment) are more likely to respond to competitive and institutional bandwagon 
pressures by adopting an innovation when it threatens an existing business, rather than when it 
represents new business opportunities.  However, for both underwriting innovations, the authors 
find that adoption by one bank makes it more desirable for other banks to follow suit – and this 
effect increases in the number of adopters. 
 More recently, Akhavein, Frame, and White (2001) examine the diffusion of small business 
credit scoring (SBCS) by large banking organizations in the mid-1990s.  Estimates from a hazard 
model indicate that larger banking organizations and those located in the New York Federal 
Reserve district adopted this technology sooner.  A tobit model confirms these results and also finds 
that organizations with fewer separately chartered banks, but more branches, introduced innovation 
earlier, which is consistent with theories stressing the importance of bank organizational form on 
lending style. 
 
 D. Consequences: Profitability and Social Welfare. 
 Studies of the consequences of financial innovation represent the largest number of 
empirical studies.   
 Garbade and Silber (1978) examine the effects of a major input innovation for finance: the 
establishment of the telegraph in the nineteenth century.  They find that the telegraph quickly 
narrowed inter-market price differentials for securities and for foreign exchange across U.S. 
markets in the 1840s and for bonds between New York and London in 1866.  They also find that 
the establishment of the consolidated tape for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) securities in 
1975 did not cause price differentials to narrow between the NYSE and the Midwest Stock 
Exchange.  For this latter case, the authors conclude that the pre-existing telecommunications links 
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were likely sufficient, such that consolidated tape added little value. 
 Tufano (1989) examines a cross-section of new securities to examine whether financial 
product innovators enjoy first mover advantages.  Specifically, he uses a sample of 58 innovations 
(representing 1,944 public offerings) to test whether investment banks that create new securities 
benefit by charging higher prices (underwriting spreads) than imitators or by capturing larger 
quantities.  Tufano finds that, over the 1974-1986 period, investment banks that created new 
products did not charge higher prices in the period before imitative products appear and in the long-
run charge lower prices than rivals.  However, these innovators underwrote more public offerings of 
products that they innovated, than did imitating rivals.  Overall, Tufano’s results are not consistent 
with monopoly pricing of new securities issues by innovators, but rather with the presence of cost 
advantages that allow these institutions to capture market share. 
 Two papers examined the welfare effects of specific security innovations.  First, Varma and 
Chambers (1990) study the wealth effects associated with the issuance announcement of original 
issue deep discount (OID) bonds.22  They find that OID issues announced between March 1981 and 
June 1982 were associated with positive stock-price responses, while subsequent issues that were 
not tax-advantaged had no wealth effects.23  Neither the stated purpose of the debt nor the bond 
rating explained any cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns.   
 Second, Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) find that investors use Treasury STRIPS to make 
markets more complete and to take advantage of tax and accounting asymmetries.24,25  The authors 
                                                           
    22 OID bonds are issued at prices below par and with coupons set below the market rate. 
    23 This result contrasts with the negative effect often found for debt-financing announcements.   
 
    24 STRIPS refer to the Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities. This program 
allows investors to strip Treasury notes and bonds and create separate discount bonds and reconstitute 
previously stripped notes and bonds. 
    25 Theoretical models of security design (e.g., Allen and Gale 1988), suggest that successful derivatives 
allocate cash flows to the investors who value them the most, thereby allowing securities to be held in their 
most valuable form. 
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estimate a joint model of stripping and reconstitution activity using data for 1990-1994 and find that 
such activities are positively correlated.  They also find that stripping and reconstitution are not 
driven by valuation differences between Treasury STRIPS and comparable bonds, but rather to the 
presence of long-dated issues.  Tax and accounting rationales, as proxied by bond coupon rates and 
prices, are also important to explaining these activities.  In short, Grinblatt and Longstaff conclude 
that STRIPS are used for fundamental economic reasons, and not as attempts to exploit arbitrage 
profit opportunities. 
 Examination of the welfare effects of process financial innovations appears is limited to 
three recent studies focusing on large banking organizations’ adoption of small business credit 
scoring (SBCS) in the mid-1990s.26  Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) find that, for 1997, 
large banking organizations using SBCS had portfolio shares of small business loans under 
$100,000 to total assets 8.4 percentage points higher than similar institutions that did not.   Frame, 
Padhi, and Woosley (2001) use census-tract level information for the southeastern U.S. in 1997 and 
find that SBCS usage was related to increases in the volume of commercial credits under $100,000 
and that this effect is twice as large in low- and moderate-income census tracts than in middle and 
high-income areas.  Finally, Berger, Frame, and Miller (2001) confirm the findings of increased 
credit availability for small businesses and also identify higher average prices and greater risk levels 
for these credits under $100,000.  The authors contend that this indicates increased lending to 
riskier “marginal” borrowers that, in the absence of SBCS, may not have had access to small 
business credit from banks at all.  In looking at the 1995-1997 period, the authors also find that 
bank-specific and industry-wide learning curves for SBCS have important effects and that the 
welfare effects differed depending on the way a large bank utilized SBCS (i.e., as a more cost-
                                                           
    26 It is worth noting that SBCS did not originate within the banking industry, but rather was pioneered by 
Fair, Isaac Company.  Their original model, introduced in 1995, pooled small business loan performance 
data provided by Robert Morris Associates for 17 large U.S. banks.  See Eisenbeis (1996) and Mester 
(1997) for discussions of the history of SBCS. 
  
 
22
effective way of underwriting loans or as a way of obtaining more accurate credit evaluations). 
 Four studies have empirically studied bank holding companies' (BHCs) formation of 
Section 20 subsidiaries to underwrite securities in the late 1980s and the 1990s.  First, Bhargava 
and Fraser (1998), using event studies, find that BHCs experienced abnormal positive returns from 
the initial Federal Reserve decisions to permit banks to form and expand these subsidiaries, but 
negative abnormal returns from subsequent decisions to permit BHCs to expand their corporate 
underwriting.  Second, Fields and Fraser (1999) find that the pay-performance sensitivity of the 
CEOs of BHCs that enter securities underwriting increases during their transition into underwriting 
but remains substantially less than the sensitivity found in investment banks.  Third, Gande, Puri, 
and Saunders (1999) find that BHC entry into underwriting tended to decrease underwriting market 
concentration and, consistent with the consequent increased competition, decreased underwriter 
spreads and ex ante yields.  Finally, Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) find that the pre-tax cash 
flow of BHCs that established Section 20 subsidiaries tended to increase, as compared to BHCs that 
did not establish subsidiaries and to investment banks.  The change does appear to be due to their 
entry into the new line of business.  The authors also find that the riskiness of the banks did not 
change subsequent to their entry. 
 The characteristics of Internet-only start-up (de novo) banks in the late 1990s have received 
attention from DeYoung (2001a, 2001b).  He finds that, as compared with conventional de novo 
banks, the Internet de novos are less profitable, due to low business volumes (fewer deposits and 
lower non-interest income) and high labor expenditures.  However, DeYoung’s research also 
suggests that the financial performance of de novo Internet banks improves more quickly over time 
than does that of conventional de novos.  He attributes these findings to: 1) technology-based 
learning effects, and 2) technology-specific scale effects.  As a result, DeYoung’s findings offer 
some hope that the Internet-only format may eventually be viable. 
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 F. A summing up. 
 We have surveyed the 24 empirical studies of financial innovation that we were able to 
uncover, using quite broad criteria.  It is worth noting, however, that only 14 separate phenomena 
are covered, since some financial innovations are examined by more than one study.27  Some 
summary characteristics are in order: 
 - Only five studies precede the 1990s – and 14 have appeared since 2000! 
 - Only two studies address the environmental conditions that encourage financial 
innovations.  Thus, the hypotheses advanced by the broad descriptive literature on innovation 
remain largely untested.  Five studies address the characteristics of the customers for and users of 
financial innovations.  Six studies address the diffusion of financial innovations.  The remaining 
studies examine consequences and (explicitly or implicitly) welfare effects. 
 - Only one study covers financial patenting; five cover innovations that pertain to securities 
or securities underwriting; the remaining 18 studies apply to banking. 
 - Two financial organizational innovations (the establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries by 
BHCs and Internet-only banks) are covered by six studies.  Some studies cover financial 
product/service innovations (e.g., debit cards); some studies cover financial process innovations 
(e.g., small business credit scoring); and some studies covered innovations that could be described 
as a process or as a product/service depending on the perspective taken (e.g., the offering of Internet 
banking). 
 Taken together, these relatively few studies are suggestive (but not definitive) of some 
broader conclusions: 
•= Regulation does spur financial innovation, and this consequence should be considered before 
                                                           
    27 There are two studies of the characteristics of banks that offer Internet banking; two studies of start-up 
Internet-only banks; three studies of the diffusion of ATMs; four studies of the adoption of SBCS by large 
banks; and four studies of BHCs that established Section 20 subsidiaries. 
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new policies are implemented. 
•= The adoption and diffusion of new technologies by banks is related to institution size. 
•= The use of new financial technologies by consumers is related to age, income, and population. 
•= The welfare effects of financial innovation appear to generally be positive.  However, for 
organizational innovations this is less concrete.   
 It seems clear that considerably more empirical work is possible, especially for testing the 
hypotheses concerning the conditions that encourage innovation.  Further, some of the results that 
have been established in one area (e.g., banking) could be expanded to others.  Why this has not 
already happened will be the topic of the next section. 
 
VI. Why Are There So Few? 
 Despite the recognized importance of financial innovation and an extensive descriptive 
literature, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies.  Why is this?  We are not sure that we 
have all of the answers to this question, but we can offer some tentative (and somewhat inter-
related) conjectures. 
 1. The research and development (R&D) tradition.  Outside of finance, much of the 
empirical testing has linked innovation with formal research and development efforts by companies. 
 But this R&D linkage has largely a manufacturing focus, involving research laboratories, R&D 
budgets, and head-counts of scientists and engineers.  The National Science Foundation's (NSF) 
data collection and publication efforts have reinforced this focus.28 
                                                           
    28 From its initial year (1953) of data collection about "industrial" R&D to the present, the NSF's focus 
has been on manufacturing.  As of 1997 and 1998, the last years for which the NSF reported its annual 
industrial R&D data on the basis of the "standard industrial classification" (SIC) system, manufacturing 
enterprises accounted for about three-quarters of all reported industrial R&D and about two-thirds of all 
industrial scientists and engineers (NSF 2000).  Also, as is true for almost all SIC-based industry-wide data, 
far more detail was available for the manufacturing sector than for other sectors.  In 1999 and 2000, with the 
newer "North America industrial classification system" (NAICS), manufacturing enterprises accounted for 
three-fifths of NSF's reported industrial R&D and three-fifths of scientists and engineers (NSF 2002).  It is 
unclear as to whether the decrease in manufacturing's shares of R&D expenditures and personnel was a 
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 Financial services are not in this R&D tradition.  Financial services firms rarely have R&D 
budgets (though they do have IT budgets); they don't have laboratories; they rarely employ 
scientists and engineers.29  Therefore, empirical testing of hypotheses involving R&D are unlikely 
to occur in financial services. 
 2. The patent count tradition.  Another line of research (outside of finance) has involved 
patents and patent counts, and the testing of linkages between patent counts and the characteristics 
(including R&D) of companies and of industries.  However, patents for financial products and 
services are not common and financial services firms are unlikely to be boasting in advertisements 
about their patenting proclivities.30  Thus, empirical examinations of financial innovation using 
patent counts is unlikely to occur in financial services.  Lerner (2002) is thus far the sole exception 
to this statement. 
 3. The data.  The data that are commonly used for research about financial services -- e.g., 
the bank call reports, the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data files, and Standard & 
Poor's COMPUSTAT data files -- yield no directly useful information about financial innovation. 
 4. The industrial organization (IO) tradition.  Much of the testing of hypotheses involving 
innovation has come from individuals trained in the economics specialty of industrial organization 
and has been focused (directly or indirectly) on testing the Schumpeterian hypotheses: that the bulk 
of an economy's innovation was likely to occur in relatively large firms that possess significant 
market power.  This testing, as is true of much IO empirical work, has tended to focus on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
result of the change in the classification systems, changes in ownership of enterprises that would change the 
classification of their R&D efforts, or just a secular change in manufacturing's shares. 
    29 In 1997 and 1998 financial services firms accounted for less than 1% of NSF's reported R&D and 1-2% 
of total scientists and engineers (NSF 2000).  The data that are currently available for 2000 do not yet 
provide a sufficiently disaggregated classification of R&D expenditures to permit a corresponding estimate. 
    30 The patent statistics of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for the 1990s indicate that over 90% of 
patents granted are for inventions in manufacturing. 
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manufacturing sector, where the data (including not only the R&D and patents data just discussed 
but also industry-level data on seller concentration) are more readily available. 
 Empirically-oriented finance economists (with a few exceptions) have usually not been 
trained in IO, have usually not been taught to think about the Schumpeterian hypotheses, and have 
had less suitable data available to them for testing those (or any other) hypotheses. 
 5. A summing up.  The data and research environments have not been conducive to 
empirical work on financial innovation.  Perhaps it is not surprising after all that relatively few 
research papers have empirically tested hypotheses concerning financial innovation. 
 The data question deserves a bit more consideration.  For a number of empirical financial 
innovation studies, the crucial data have come from special surveys, often conducted by the Federal 
Reserve.  We urge financial regulators to conduct and publish more such studies and surveys and to 
make the raw data (subject to the bounds of confidentiality requirements) generally available to 
researchers.  We believe that the knowledge payoff in this area would be high. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 In this paper we have surveyed and summarized the existing empirical literature on financial 
innovation.  Along the way we have stressed the surprising fewness of research papers that 
empirically test hypotheses concerning financial innovation, although we have also offered some 
conjectures as to why that fewness might not be so surprising after all. 
 If, as Van Horne (1985, p. 621) has claimed, "One of the bedrocks of our financial system is 
financial innovation, the life blood of efficient and responsive capital markets," then more extensive 
empirical research on financial innovation would surely yield important and interesting insights 
about that bedrock.  This research need not be confined to the Schumpeterian perspective. There is 
extensive room for improvements in our society's understanding of how innovations arise, how 
their characteristics compare with those of their predecessors, why they succeed or fail, how fast the 
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successful innovations diffuse and why, who uses them and why, etc. 
 Financial innovation is all around us.  Recall the extensive, "partial list of major novelties" 
offered by Miller (1986), which we noted above.  The sixteen years since then have been at least as 
fruitful in terms of financial innovation.  The business and financial press frequently report on new 
instruments, new processes, and new organizations.  Many of the raw materials for empirical 
studies are already present, and "innovation-minded" researchers – perhaps aided by more 
regulatory surveys and greater access to them -- can surely supply the remainder. 
 We urge our fellow finance economists to expend some effort toiling in this relatively 
untilled field.  We believe that the intellectual yields will be large. 
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Appendix: A Summary of Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation 
Note: The studies in this appendix are listed in the order in which they appear in the discussion in the text. 
 
Broad Category; Study Relevant Research Questions Data Principal Conclusions 
A. Environmental Conditions:    
Ben-Horim and Silber (1977) Do regulatory restraints encourage 
financial innovation? 
Federal Reserve data and other 
sources 
Broadly speaking, regulatory 
restraints do encourage innovation.  
Lerner (2002) How much financial patenting 
occurred in the late 20th Century? 
How involved is academia with 
financial patenting? 
445 Financial patents, 1971-2000 The number of financial patent 
applications and grants was modest, 
but rapidly accelerated after a 1998 
judicial decision. 
Patenting activity of investment banks 
was related to their indirect ties to 
academia; but the direct involvement 
of academia and academics in 
patenting is not related to their 
finance-related research. 
B. Customers and Users:    
Furst, Lang, and Nolle (2002) What are the characteristics of banks 
that offer Internet services? 
Survey, 3rd quarter of 1999 Holding company affiliation, size, 
urban location, fixed expenses, and 
non-interest income are positively 
related to offering Internet banking 
services. 
Sullivan (2000) What are the characteristics of banks 
in the 10th Federal Reserve District 
that offer Internet services? 
Survey, 1st quarter of 2000 Bank size, educated population, 
population 18-64, non-interest 
expenses, and non-interest income are 
positively related to offering Internet 
banking services. 
Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley 
(2001)* 
What are the characteristics of large 
banking organizations that adopted 
small business credit scoring? 
Survey of 200 large banking 
organizations, January 1998; 
bank call reports, June 1997 
The use of small business credit 
scoring is negatively related to the 
number of subsidiary banks, but 
positively related to the number of 
bank branches. 
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Appendix: A Summary of Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation (continued) 
 
Broad Category; Study Relevant Research Questions Data Principal Conclusions 
Mantel (2000) Which consumers use electronic bill 
payment services? 
Survey of 1,300 consumers, 1999 Income, age, education, and gender 
(women) are positive influences on 
consumers’ use of electronic bill 
payment services. 
Mantel and McHugh (2001) Which consumers use debit cards? Survey of 1,300 consumers, 1999 Income, age, and local population are 
positive influences on consumers’ use 
of debit cards 
C. Diffusion:    
Hannan and McDowell (1984) Which banks were the early adopters 
of automated teller machines? 
Survey of banks use of ATMs 
between 1971-1979. 
Larger banks and those in more 
concentrated markets adopt ATMs 
earlier. 
Hannan and McDowell (1987) How does rivalry affect the process of 
adopting ATMs? 
Survey of banks’ use of ATMs 
between 1971-1979. 
Earlier adoption of ATMs is related to 
a rival’s adoption and banks in less 
concentrated markets react more 
strongly to a rival’s adoption. 
Saloner and Shepherd (1995) How does the user environment affect 
early adoption of ATMs? 
Survey of banks’ use of ATMs 
between 1971-1979. 
Earlier adoption is related to the 
presence of a larger number of users 
and locations. 
Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996) What influenced the diffusion of 
underwriting of junk bonds and of 
note issuance facilities (NIFs)? 
Junk bond issues, 1977-1986; NIFs 
arranged 1983-1986 
Exogenous factors played a 
significant role in explaining the 
diffusion of junk bond underwriting; 
bandwagon effects were important for 
the diffusion of NIFs underwriting 
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 Appendix: A Summary of Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation (continued) 
 
Broad Category; Study Relevant Research Questions Data Principal Conclusions 
Akhavein, Frame, and White (2001) What were the characteristics of the 
early adopters of small business credit 
scoring? 
Survey of 200 large banking 
organizations, 1998; 
bank call reports; 
information about the characteristics 
of chief executives. 
Larger banking organizations and 
those located in the New York Federal 
Reserve district adopted small 
business credit scoring earlier. Some 
evidence that institution’s with fewer 
separate banks but more branches, 
tended to adopt earlier.  
D. Consequences and Social 
Welfare: 
   
Garbade and Silber (1978) What were the effects of the telegraph 
on cross-market price differentials of 
securities? 
Securities price differentials before 
and after the establishment of the 
telegraph in the 1840s (U.S.) and 
before after the trans-Atlantic 
telegraph (1866) 
The introduction of the telegraph led 
to a significant decrease in price 
differentials. 
Tufano (1989) How do innovators of new securities 
benefit: higher prices or larger 
quantities? 
Sample of 58 securities that 
experienced 1,944 publicly traded 
issues over the 1974-1986 period. 
Innovators do not charge monopoly 
prices, but do achieve higher market 
shares than rivals. 
Varma and Chambers (1990) What was the stock market reaction to 
issuing original issue deep discount 
bonds (OIDs)? 
Sample of OID issues between 1981 
and 1987. 
Issues during 1981 and 1982, which 
had certain tax benefits, were 
associated with positive stock-price 
responses.  No significant response 
for OIDs following the tax law 
change. 
Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) Is the use of Treasury STRIPS driven 
by the need for market completeness 
or speculative purposes? 
Sample of 58 notes and bonds trading 
between July 1990 and December 
1994. 
Market participants’ use of the 
STRIPS program is primarily for 
making markets more complete. 
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Appendix: A Summary of Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation (continued) 
 
Broad Category; Study Relevant Research Questions Data Principal Conclusions 
Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley 
(2001)* 
Does SBCS affect small business 
credit availability? 
January 1998 survey of 200 large 
banking organizations.  Also, used 
bank call report information. 
SBCS is associated with significantly 
more lending. 
Frame, Padhi, and Woosley (2001) Does SBCS affect small business 
credit availability in low- and 
moderate-income areas?  
January 1998 survey of 200 large 
banking organizations.  Also used 
census tract-level data on small 
business lending and population 
characteristics for the southeastern 
U.S. in 1997. 
SBCS is associated with significantly 
more lending.  This is especially true 
for low- and moderate-income areas. 
Berger, Frame, and Miller (2002) Does SBCS affect small business 
credit availability, loan pricing, and 
loan risk?  
January 1998 survey of 200 large 
banking organizations.  Also used the 
Survey of Terms of Bank Lending for 
loan-level information on loan terms 
and perceived risk. 
SBCS is associated with significantly 
more lending, higher average loan 
prices, and riskier loans.    
Bhargava and Fraser (1998) Did the formation of Sec. 20 subs 
benefit bank holding companies 
(BHCs)? 
Event studies for large BHCs, 1987-
1996 
Only early permission announcements 
were associated with positive 
abnormal stock returns. 
Fields and Fraser (1999) What is the pay-performance of the 
CEOs of BHCs that form Sec. 20 
subs? 
Large BHCs 1992 The sensitivity is higher relative to 
other BHCs, but less than that for 
investment banks. 
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 Appendix: A Summary of Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation (continued) 
 
Broad Category; Study Relevant Research Questions Data Principal Conclusions 
Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) What are the competitive effects of 
BHC entry into securities 
underwriting? 
Debt issues sample, 1985-1996 BHC entry has led to decreased 
market concentration, narrower 
underwriter spreads, and decreased ex 
ante yields. 
Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) What are the financial consequences 
for BHCs that establish Sec. 20 subs? 
Large BHCs, 1987-1997 These BHCs have  increased 
revenues,but their risk profiles are 
unchanged. 
DeYoung (2001a) How do de novo Internet-only banks 
different from conventional de novo 
banks? 
Late 1990s bank data De novo Internet-only banks are less 
profitable, have lower business 
volumes, and higher labor 
expenditures than other de novo 
banks. 
DeYoung (2001b) Do start-up Internet-only de novos 
improve their financial performance 
more rapidly than do conventional de 
novos? 
Late 1990s bank data De novo Internet-only banks improve 
their financial performance more 
rapidly than do conventional de 
novos.  
 
* Study appears in two sections 
 
 
